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Abstract 
Fiscal decentralization concept is highly discussed at various levels 
and aspects, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development gives it an extreme attention as well as the World Bank. 
There is no complete overview of the sciences literature of the fiscal 
decentralization and economics of federalism and, even though scholarly 
interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. 
The fiscal federalism and decentralization sciences literature is grouped 
into two main groups: the first generation of theory and the second 
generation of theory. This research aim - critically analyse the fiscal 
federalism first and second generation theories. This article offers a 
critical and in-depth review and evaluation of the important elements of 
current knowledge and theoretical development of fiscal federalism and 
decentralization.  
Keywords: fiscal federalism, fiscal decentralization, first 
generation of theories, second generation of theories. 
JEL Codes: H3, H4, H7. 
 
Introduction 
The theoretical issues on the decentralization questions are found in 
the 17th-19th century philosophers and politicians‘ such as Rousseau, 
Tocqueville, Mill, de Montesquieu and Madison works, when not relying 
on the central government, the less democratic government units were 
thought to be capable of providing basic human freedoms and rights 
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(Faguet, 1997). In the second half of the 20th century, Western countries 
in order to reduce the long-term cumbrous and stagnant state government 
apparatus developed the theory of fiscal federalism. By using 
decentralization, the representatives of this theory were searching for 
ways to optimise the management of public finance. Even in the middle 
of the 20th century, fiscal federalism is included in public finance 
theories, which paved the way for the systematic analysis of the fiscal 
decentralization. 
Fiscal federalism is basically a standard, rather than a positivist 
theory explaining "as it should be," instead of "why is that ". The theory 
of fiscal federalism (Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 1959) distinguishes 
between two public finance management levels - the central and local. 
The purpose of this theory is to determine at what level and what budget 
functions have been financed to achieve the set up targets at the lowest 
expenses. According to Musgrave (1959), who distinguishes two main 
reasons which are based on the theory of fiscal federalism, and may 
encourage financial centralisation- the pursuit of scale economy and 
external consequents beyond the countries’ borders. Thus the public 
finance decentralization is more effective when dominated by large 
differences in the preferences of the citizens. 
Scale economy can be achieved, by centralising the management of 
finance, when the threshold of "production" costs is decreasing, or the 
number of the users is increasing, herewith their obtained satisfaction 
grows (for example, network products). However, in this case, though, 
not necessarily, there is the loss of flexibility- the suggested "product" 
best meets the needs of the average consumer still the lack of diversity of 
supply appears. So, when citizens ' preferences are very heterogeneous, it 
is proposed to provide public services (and in most cases finance) on a 
decentralized basis. Finally, having external consequents crossed the 
countries’ borders  (to be more precise, air pollution or some cases of 
National Defence), if these consequents do not internalise or privately 
agree on their compensation, it is necessary to carry out centralized 
taxation/subsidy of the external consequents. 
The main question relating to fiscal decentralization is the extent to 
which financial powers and responsibility should be transferred to the 
lower state management level. Researchers in this area have considerably 
increased, and scholars began to distinguish between the first and second 
generation of fiscal federalism theories. According to the Australian 
researcher Vo (2010), the theme of fiscal federalism is not as widely 
investigated as unemployment, inflation, foreign investment, interest 
Slavinskaite et. al. / Theoretical Analysis of the Fiscal Federalism 
www.ijceas.com 
252 
 
rates, exchange rates, however, the interest in this area is growing 
rapidly, with an average growth rate seeking 28%, and this theme is the 
second fastest growing among the mentioned above. Between of foreign 
and Lithuanian authors it is worth mentioning (Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 
1959; Olson, 1969;  Oates, 1972; Brennan, Buchanan, 1980; Brown, 
Jackson, 1990; Weingast, 1995; Seabright, 1996; Lockwood, 2002; 
Besley, Coate, 2003; Petchey, Levtchenkova, 2003; Wagner, 2007; 
Prakash, 2015; Faggini, Parziale, 2016). 
The article object – theories of fiscal federalism. The aim of this 
article is to critically analyse the theoretical aspect of the fiscal 
federalism first and second generation theories.  
 
The Main Principles of Fiscal Federalism         
Fiscal decentralization is significant to the developing countries‘ 
economy in particular and is promoted through international institutions 
such as the World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). A number of scientific studies in 
the field of fiscal decentralization have been made, in order to 
systematically understand economic principles (Bird, 2004; Boadway, 
2003; Collins, 2001; McLure, 1998). The following main principles of 
fiscal federalism are identified (Brown, Jackson, 1990; Slavinskaitė, 
2014): 
− the principle of diversity. The federal system should provide the 
ability to tax diversity procedures, taking into account the 
diversity of different countries and areas. The community may 
differ, and the provision of public services should not be 
performed according to the same model; 
− the principle of equivalence. A spatial volume of different public 
services varies, for example, the benefit to all residents of the 
country is defence, to the residents of regions - it is road 
maintenance and construction, to local residents - it is the city's 
politics and street lighting. Fiscal measures would be really 
effective if each type of the service is assigned and implemented 
to the given area, which needs it the most; 
− the centralized principle of redistribution. The redistribution 
function of fiscal policy must be centralized. Otherwise, the 
redistribution becomes ineffective and local decisions are 
distorted. 
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− the principle of neutrality of the area. Regional fiscal differences 
may interfere with the economic activity of the area. Small fiscal 
differences are unavoidable in fiscal federalism, but they have to 
be reduced. Differential taxes should be avoided as they distort 
the local government decisions; 
− the centralized principle of stabilisation. Fiscal measures should 
be used at the national level that combines macro-politics 
(stabilization, growth) aims; 
− the control of the central government. Decentralization is defined 
as the transfer of the central government functions to the local 
authorities, but the central government has to maintain a certain 
form of control and  supervise the activities of the local 
government in spending, borrowing, taxes, budget, audit and 
other spheres; 
− the minimal most important public service provision. The central 
government is to ensure each citizen  minimum essential public 
services in health, safety, welfare, education and other spheres, no 
matter where the residence place of the member is; 
− fiscal position equalization. This is the allocation of financial 
resources, in order to avoid the cost of public services and the 
local government revenue differences. 
The evolution of the theories of fiscal federalism can be divided 
into two phases, the differences in content and extent, and the scientific 
works analysing the theoretical and practical aspects of fiscal 
decentralization, accordingly, are classified into two periods od fiscal 
decentralization analysis (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure. 1. First and second-generation theories of fiscal 
federalism 
The first generation of the fiscal federalism theory (from 1950 till 
now) sought the efficiency of public services and strengthening of local 
government responsibility. The second theory of fiscal federalism (from 
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1980 to the present) is new and still not sustainable for the system 
analysis or is not well-known yet. Further on, the theoretical 
development of fiscal decentralization, distinguishing between the first 
and second generation of the theories of fiscal federalism, will be 
reviewed. 
The first generation of the fiscal federalism 
The foundation of the first generation of the fiscal federalism 
theory was laid in the 1950s – 1960s by British and French colonial 
administrations, which were in the process of getting state independence, 
and transferred the responsibility of certain programmes implementation 
to the local authorities. This theory was created by the scholars Musgrave 
(1959), and Oates (1972) and developed as the public sector economy. 
The theory of fiscal federalism is focused on fiscal responsibility and 
distribution of public sector functions among various levels of the 
governmental public sector. According to Oates (1972), the theory of 
fiscal federalism is developed in line with the overall system for the 
allocation of the functions of various governmental levels accordingly 
distributing fiscal measures as appropriate, and carrying out these 
functions. 
This theory provides the understanding of the tools and functions 
that would best work through centralisation or decentralization The first 
generation of the theorists (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972) tend to 
associate the fiscal decentralization process with the public degree of 
response, depending on the demand, and, finally, an increase in economic 
efficiency for better linking the allocation of resources with the needs of 
the citizens. Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959), Oates (1972), laid a solid 
basis for discussions on fiscal decentralization issues. 
An important contribution to the theory of fiscal federalism made 
Olson (1969) by introducing the concept of "fiscal equalization". 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) with their theoretical studies presented the 
public choice approach to various levels of the government and 
contributed with a new scientific publication "The Power to Tax in 
Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution "(table 1) to the 
replenishment of the scientific literature of the first generation of fiscal 
decentralisation. 
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Table 1. Researchers of the first generation theories of fiscal federalism 
Author 
(year) 
Issue Contribution to the theory of fiscal federalism 
Tiebout 
(1956) 
A Pure Theory 
of Local 
Expenditures 
For the first time defined the concept of "local 
public goods." He stated that the mobility of the 
citizens improves the efficiency of government 
expenditure, because each region offers different 
service packages and a variety of taxation. 
Musgrave 
(1959) 
The Theory of 
Public Finance – 
A Study in 
Public Economy 
He stated that the fiscal decentralization brings an 
efficient allocation of the resources. He has 
introduced three features of the government: the 
stabilisation of the economy, resources and the 
distribution of income. The stabilisation of the 
economy and income distribution must be 
centralized, and the allocation of resources is 
decentralized.  
Olson 
(1969) 
Principle of 
fiscal 
equivalence: the 
division of 
responsibilities 
among different 
levels of 
government 
Introduced the concept of "financial equalization". 
Stated that each common good has a certain limit, 
which is necessary for any government in order to 
avoid a competition among those who pay and 
those who receive the benefits of the collective 
good. 
 
Oates 
(1972) 
Fiscal 
Federalism 
Created decentralization theorem. He declared that 
welfare is maximized, when the specific public 
goods are provided by the local government 
whose jurisdiction corresponds to the subset of the 
country's citizens, and the demands for public 
goods and services are the same. 
Brennan, 
Buchanan 
(1980) 
The Power to 
Tax – Analytical 
Foundations of a 
Fiscal 
Constitution 
Introduced the public choice approach to different 
levels of power. Stated that the fiscal 
decentralization reduces the size of the 
government and that the state's income and 
expenditure must be decentralized. 
Source: Slavinskaitė 2015 
 
The first Musgrave‘s (1959) book "The Theory of Public Finance" 
was the largest contribution as the textbook in the public field of 
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Economics. Musgrave (1959) introduced three different governmental 
functions: economic stabilization, income redistribution and allocation of 
resources. Each feature has been individually and sequentially analyzed. 
According to Musgrave (1959), specific perspectives of fiscal federalism 
are defined after establishing fiscal decentralization constraints 
(economic stabilization and redistribution of income) and evaluating the 
potential fiscal decentralization benefits (efficiency). 
The first function of the government is economic stabilization. 
Fiscal and monetary policy can contribute to the stable development of 
the economy. The most important question is whether fiscal 
decentralization increases or reduces economic stability and general 
government macro-economic target compromises. This point was clearly 
expressed by the representatives of the first generation: fiscal 
decentralization does not help strengthen the objectives of the agreements 
in order to reach macro-stabilization goals. The transfer of powers from 
the central government to the local authorities has possible macro-
stabilization constraints (Oates, 1972). 
The second function of the government is the redistribution of 
income. The government usually produces economic goods and at the 
same time assumes the role to take part in the distribution of the goods 
among the members of the society and change the settings of the market. 
Taxes may be progressive, and welfare services may target lower-income 
members of the citizens. Thus, this shows that in fiscal decentralization 
there is no exact system to efficiently distribute social income because of 
the economic dependence between the jurisdictions of the local 
government which reduces the diversity of service provision existing 
among the lower-level authorities. With regard to the distribution income 
objective between the central and local government, income 
redistribution policies have greater success if carried out at the national 
level (Oates, 1972). 
The third function of the government is the allocation of 
resources. Here, the first generation of fiscal federalism theorists stress 
the importance of fiscal decentralization and indicate two main reasons: 
first, the limited resources can be more efficiently allocated for the fiscal 
system being decentralized, because the local government can better 
know how to maximize the benefits of the use of resources in their areas. 
Secondly, goods of the local authorities apply the dimension for the 
provision of local services items, for which the central government is not 
ready. The result is that local government has the ability to play an 
important role in the effective allocation of resources in fiscal 
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decentralization. It is proposed to mobilise the allocation of resources in 
the region, in order to better serve and identify the heterogeneous 
preferences and tastes of the citizens. 
So the first generation of fiscal federalism theory, taking into 
account Musgrave (1959) in particular, stresses that public economic 
goods are related to the effective allocation of resources. The theory of 
public finance has links with the stabilisation of the economy (that is, to 
maintain a high level of employment and a stable price level) and the 
distribution of income (both to achieve horizontal and vertical justice in 
all jurisdictions, in order to avoid inefficiency and mobility of households 
and enterprises). Public finance theory is considered to be the first 
generation fiscal decentralization theory. 
Tiebout (1956) introduced the concept of "local government 
goods" (local public goods) in the theory of public finance. He used this 
concept in terms of political and fiscal decentralization while analyzing 
the mobilisation of the local population between the areas, which are in 
the competition having to consolidate the preferences. Tiebout‘s (1956) 
essence of the hypothesis is that the consumer demand for local 
government goods may be revealed, when users select the jurisdiction, 
providing the maximum net benefit. The hypothesis claims that the 
mobility of the user within the electoral preferences can be revealed and 
the consumer demand will be at that point or close to it, where the local 
government expenditure items correspond to the demand. Now this 
hypothesis is generally known as Tiebout sorting (Tiebout sorting). First 
of all, it was a response to the lack of the public goods problem 
provision, which at the time was examined by Samuelson (1954). 
Tiebout (1956) stated that public goods are provided by the 
regions being at competition and taking into account the wishes of the 
users, which encourage the efficient provision of public services, whereas 
Samuelson (1954) stated that public goods are produced when no one can 
reject them, and the fact is that the increasing number of the users does 
not change the consumption of public goods, that is, the limit remains the 
same. Policy,  promoting the mobility of the citizens and developing 
knowledge of the benefits and costs of public goods, encourages 
migration, which performs as a force for improving the efficiency of 
government expenditure. Samuelson (1954) also stated that greater 
mobility of households from one region to another and greater efficiency 
of the allocation of resources are ongoing  constantly. 
Slavinskaite et. al. / Theoretical Analysis of the Fiscal Federalism 
www.ijceas.com 
258 
 
Tiebout (1956) believed that the local authorities have more 
accurate and more detailed knowledge of the local needs of the citizens, 
so local citizens can be taxed easier and more accurately. He said that 
each region has different service baskets and a variety of taxation, which 
promote the mobility of the citizens. To sum up, it can be remarked that 
Tiebout (1956) established two major innovations in the field of fiscal 
decentralization: first, the main idea is the existence of non-public goods 
provided by the local government; secondly, he showed that the 
movement of taxpayers and voters between the jurisdictions create the 
mechanism according to which the persons reveal their priority to non-
net public goods. 
Olson (1969) has defined a new concept – "fiscal equalization" 
theory in fiscal federalism. The definition of fiscal equalization states that 
each of the common goods has a certain limit, which is necessary for any 
government to avoid competition between the paying and receiving the 
benefits of the collective good. In a broad sense, it creates a positive 
parallel with the public economic efficiency purpose to provide public 
goods costs and supply benefits in the multi-tiered federal systems. 
Another contribution to the theory of fiscal federalism was Oates 
monograph (1972)" Fiscal federalism ". Oates  fiscal federalism theory 
was based on Olson’s (1969) proposed fiscal equalization concept and 
Tiebout’s (1956) approach to the provision of public goods, rejecting 
mobility and sorting. He stated that there should be a different variation 
of the provision of public services or goods because residents have 
different needs and tastes. Oates (1972) formulated his approach to this 
question by defining public goods as net and non-net ones. The scientist 
created a theorem of decentralization, which has a clear basis. According 
to the theorem, welfare is  maximized, when the specific public goods are 
provided by the local government whose jurisdiction corresponds to the 
subset of the country's citizens and the public goods demand and services 
are the same. 
If the national government has undertaken to provide the same 
service or a package of public goods in all sub-national jurisdictions, it 
will be impossible to achieve the efficiency level if the preferences are 
the same for all members of the population. According to Oates’s 
statement (1972), the national government's provision of public goods 
does not reflect the reality. In fact, this assumption has been criticised by 
Brennan, Buchanan (1980), however, it may be justified for two reasons: 
first, the national government does not have detailed information on the 
wishes and tastes of the local citizens. Secondly, although the national 
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government can provide different levels and different types of public 
services in different regions, still there are certain political constraints. 
In this respect, the national government, to a certain extent, is 
constrained to provide equal public services or goods for only a certain 
region, avoiding the possible negative political impact that may arise 
through differentiation of levels of all of the goods or services in sub-
nacional jurisdictions. For example, in Australia, members of the 
government must behave the same - tax rates for goods and services 
cannot be different in New South Wales and Western Australia, even 
though the public service levels are different. 
Already in 1660 the philosopher Hobbes (1660) in his work 
"Leviathan," described the so called community or the state as an 
artificial human being of greater height and stronger powers than a 
normal person whose sovereignty is a fictional soul giving life and 
movement to the whole body. Brennan, Buchanan (1980) revived the 
definition of state according to Leviathan. As these researchers state the 
government is a monolitic Leviathan, who always seeks to increase the 
maximum tax revenue. The only way to restrain the government is to 
apply political and financial decentralization. In their submission, the 
competition between government agencies reduces the growth of the 
public sector. 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) considered that, if the security 
functions are imposed on the national government, such government has 
a real incentive to increase the net surplus, because there are no effective 
measures to control the powers of taxation. Fiscal decentralization limits 
power, by promoting the transfer of the relevant jurisdictions in the 
provision of services and goods to its own citizens, increasing efficiency; 
so the local residents will choose the best local government. The existing 
fiscal decentralization arouses the pressure from all governmental units 
not to exempt too much. In general, Leviathan’s hypothesis on the 
government presented a new fiscal federalism approach, which identifies 
the main fiscal decentralization advantage – a smaller quantity of the 
government. 
 The second generation of the fiscal federalism 
The second generation fiscal federalism theory (beginning 1991). 
In the context of globalization processes when global economic 
interoperability is growing and societies are becoming complex and 
increase their interdependence between themselves due to the expansion 
of the network of technological development in the world of 
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communication, the team system parties transform to a market economy 
and democracy, thus making it possible to be involved in a more open 
mindset towards political and economic governance. The evolution of the 
state management determines the forces of globalization and localization 
of the interface (Ebel, Peter, 2007). For the following processes in the 
twentieth century, at the end of the 1990s, began to emerge the fiscal 
federalism theory of the second generation, which is based not only on 
the public finance ideas. 
The latter researches involve not only the economic disciplines but 
also political and other sciences. Unlike the first generation, the second 
generation researchers assume that in order to increase one’s target 
functions, there cannot be pursued the maximization of social welfare. 
The impact of the fiscal decentralization modelled by the scientists is 
materialized in the political process and the possibility of asymmetric 
information between policy agents. The investigators of the second 
generation of fiscal federalism (Weingast, 1995; Seabright, 1996; 
Lockwood, 2002; Besley, Coate, 2003; Petchey, Levtchenkova, 2003; 
Wagner, 2007) started to examine the fiscal decentralization based on the 
principles of company and contract theories, economic information and 
agents’ problems. 
According to Oates (2005), it is difficult to give a simple and 
systematic description to the second generation theories, however, he 
distinguishes two main arguments that have been highlighted in the 
second generation of the proponents of fiscal federalism: 
• The first argument was related to the conduct of the political processes and 
political agents, where participants can have their own objectives, for 
example, government officials may not seek the common good, as it was 
considered by the first generation proponents of fiscal federalism. Instead, 
they may seek to increase the prosperity of their districts. The process 
involves the modelling of political institutions. This fact has the obvious 
link to the public choice theory, which was not the main thing to the 
theoreticians of the first generation (Piccotto, Wiesner, 1998). Inman, 
Rubinfeld (1997) who described the first generation theories as economic 
federalism in contrast with newer models, clearly constituting political 
processes and their effects on results;  
• The second related question was the analysis of the political agents. First of 
all, the asymmetric information in the settings clarified that some of the 
participants, when compared with others, have more knowledge on local 
tastes and the cost structure which are inaccessible to other participants. The 
investigation has shown that the optimal procedure or institutions may be of 
quite a different level, while estimating the perfect information. In order to 
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examine these issues, fiscal federalism analyzes the macro-economic theory 
and industrial organization work perspective.  
Many of the works of the second generation fiscal representatives 
on fiscal federalism review the balance between centralisation and 
decentralization, so often the question is to decentralise or centralise? 
They acknowledge that there may be a risk if the degree of fiscal 
decentralization is too high. The second generation theory has been 
characterized by two motivating words: incentive and knowledge. Both 
motives should contribute to the higher economic efficiency: incentives 
to local authorities to make a better job to prevent people leaving the 
companies; and the knowledge of the wishes of the local citizens and the 
taste is very important in order to achieve economic efficiency, when 
public goods and services are provided by the local authorities. 
The basic scientific studies, assigned to the second generation of 
proponents on fiscal federalism were carried out, Weingast (1995), 
Seabright (1996), Lockwood (2002), Besley, Coate (2003), Petchey, 
Levtchenkova (2003) and Wagner (2007) (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Researchers of the second generation theories of fiscal 
federalism 
Author  
(year) Issue 
Contribution to the theory of fiscal 
federalism 
Weingast 
(1995) 
The economic role of 
political institutions: 
market-preserving 
federalism and economic 
development 
Introduced the concept of the market in the 
federalism theory. Stated that federalism 
provides the political framework of the 
single market. 
Seabright 
(1996) 
Accountability and 
decentralisation in 
government: an incomplete 
contracts model 
Established an incomplete agreement 
concept. Stated that political accountability 
can be organisational motivation for fiscal 
decentralization. 
Lockwood 
(2002) 
Distributive politics and 
the costs of centralisation 
Unlike Oates said that public services 
provided by the national government may 
not necessarily be homogeneous, and the 
central government is composed of locally 
elected representatives in the regions and, 
therefore, may well represent them. 
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Besley, 
Coate 
(2003) 
Centralized versus 
decentralized provision of 
local public goods: a 
political economy      
approach 
Submit the political economy approach to 
the provision of public goods on a 
decentralised and centralised basis. 
Petchey, 
Levtchenk
ova (2003) 
The welfare effects of 
fiscal equalisation in a 
federal economy with 
factor mobility and 
strategic behaviour 
They state that fiscal equalisation (grants) 
is not determined externally, it is carried 
out in accordance with the fiscal standards, 
which shall be determined, taking into 
account the actual fiscal behavior, and this 
model gives a better efficiency. 
Wagner 
(2007) 
Fiscal Sociology and the 
Theory of Public Finance: 
An Exploratory Essay 
His point of view on a polycentric 
government is more important than the 
government's hierarchical aspect, which 
defines the solution of the questions and 
options must be provided at the national 
and sub-national levels of the government. 
Source: Authors 
 
The first review of the new literature stream considers the 
decentralization theorem in the context of the political economy. The 
second group of researchers explores the principles of electoral 
accountability in the agents’ models, searching for a compromise on the 
centralisation and decentralization. Essentially, voters are directors, and 
politicians are agents, so the existence of asymmetric information 
between them may be seen as the main reason why the government is 
ineffective. Decentralization can reduce the generation criteria of 
information asymmetry and tax competition among the levels of 
government sub-national authority levels, in this way voters can increase 
the control of politicians, and promote greater voters’ responsibility, 
which would increase government efficiency. 
Weingast (1995) presents the market concept in federalism 
theories in order to examine how the competing jurisdictions create 
incentives for smaller transactions costs and reliable commitments. He 
assumes that the hierarchy of the governments with the autonomy of each 
governmental level is institutionalized. Weingast (1995) modelled 
market, where: 1) local government has regulatory responsibility for the 
economy; 2) the common market ensures that the local government could 
not prevent the marketing of goods and services from other jurisdictions; 
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3) local authorities are faced with a limitation of the budget. The main 
findings have been designed for Great Britain and the United States: 1. 
federalism provides a political framework for the common market; 2) 
bans for national government to use economic regulation drastically 
reduces the government's policy regulation to the interest groups; 3) the 
internal trade barriers allow entrepreneurs, new companies and new 
economic activities develop new areas, which are likely to outrival the 
previous. 
Seabright (1996), unlike Weingast (1995) has defined the concept 
of "incomplete agreement". The author has submitted the election in the 
context of the "incomplete agreement", as such where some information 
is not fully confirmed. Political accountability can be organizational 
motivation for decentralization. Seabright (1996) defined the concept of 
accountability as accountability of elections, as it is formulated, taking 
into account the probability that the levels of wealth in certain 
jurisdictions is determined by the election of the government. The 
decisive argument is that accountability is a major force in the elections, 
in which the fiscal decentralization can contribute to a more efficient 
governmental activity. 
First of all, Besley and Smart (2007) noted that the elections 
provide responsibility based on two different phenomena: the effect of 
selection, because the voters may decide not to re-elect the bad former 
incumbents, and the effect of discipline, the bad government incumbents 
can improve the quality of work, in order to increase the chances of re-
election. On the contrary, centralisation would be even a better process, 
as some of the mechanisms related to the "incomplete agreement" give 
more opportunities for policy cooperation between the different levels of 
the government. 
In Lockwood (2002) and Besley, Coate (2003)  fiscal federalism 
theory the starting point is Oates (1972),  decentralization theorem, 
however the authors state that the goods and services, which are provided 
by the national government, does not have to be homogeneous as it was 
originally believed by Oates (1972). These scholars clearly deviate from 
the fundamental theorem of decentralization, when examining the 
compromise between centralisation and decentralization of political 
economic environment. They believe in the more appropriate realistic 
environment, where the provision of public goods may be set at different 
levels in all regions, as well as in the case of centralisation – the 
negotiation process between regional representatives. 
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Another contribution to the theory of fiscal federalism for the 
second generation was Australian researchers Petchey, Levtchenkov’s 
(2003, 2004) fiscal equalization in scientific researchers, which, stated 
that grants for equalization are not determined externally. Fiscal 
equalization is carried out according to fiscal standards, which are 
determined, taking into account the actual fiscal behaviour. 
The scholars of the second generation of fiscal federalism do not 
oppose the first generation of fiscal federalism theories, only classify the 
fiscal decentralization. Although the used model spectrum of the 
proponents of the second generation of fiscal federalism theory is 
different, most of them are looking for a compromise between 
centralisation and decentralization, however, we can find a good number 
of the first generation scholars’ insight. 
And finally, the second generation of fiscal federalism theory 
appears in the public choice theory, developed by researcher Wagner 
(2007). His attention moved from the powers and responsibilities of the 
government at all levels, focusing the attention on the competing 
polycentric characteristics of the government. This is related to the 
concentration in the process, during which various centres of the 
government respond to the needs of the services provided to the public, 
in such a way that they are integrated into the market economy. 
In Wagner's (2007) point of view, a polycentric government is 
more important than the governmental hierarchical aspect, where the 
defined functions must be carried out at the national and sub-national 
levels of the government. In the process, during which the government 
will respond to the new demands of the community, is directly linked to 
the ability to increase their earnings in an innovative way. In addition, the 
main attention is paid to the government company where some 
government units fulfil the role of the public manufacturer services and 
some who take the role of the public service role of articulatory. 
 Conclusion and Recommendations    
The evolution of the theories of fiscal federalism can be divided 
into two phases, the differences in content and extent, and the scientific 
works analysing the theoretical and practical aspects of fiscal 
decentralization, accordingly, are classified into two periods of fiscal 
decentralization analysis. 
The first generation of fiscal federalism theory stresses that public 
economic goods are related to the effective allocation of resources. The 
theory of public finance has links with the stabilisation of the economy 
(that is, to maintain a high level of employment and a stable price level) 
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and the distribution of income (both to achieve horizontal and vertical 
justice in all jurisdictions, in order to avoid inefficiency and mobility of 
households and enterprises).  
Many of the works of the second generation fiscal representatives 
on fiscal federalism review the balance between centralisation and 
decentralization, so often the question is to decentralise or centralise? 
They acknowledge that there may be a risk, if the degree of fiscal 
decentralization is too high. 
The scholars of the second generation of fiscal federalism do not 
oppose the first generation of fiscal federalism theories, only classify the 
fiscal decentralization. Although the used model spectrum of the 
proponents of the second generation of fiscal federalism theory is 
different, most of them are looking for a compromise between 
centralisation and decentralization, however, we can find a good number 
of the first generation scholars’ insight. 
 
References 
Besley, T.; Coate, S. (2003). Centralized versus decentralized provision 
of local public goods: a political economy approach, Journal of Public 
Economics 87: 2611–2637. 
Besley, T.; Smart, M. (2007). Fiscal restraints and voter welfare, Journal 
of Public Economics 91: 755–773 
Bird, R. (2004). Transfers and incentives in intergovernmental fiscal 
relations, Annual World Bank Conference on Development in Latin 
America and the Caribbean 111–125. 
Boadway, R. (2003). National taxation, fiscal federalism and global 
taxation. The WIDER Project on Innovation Sources of Development 
Finance, Queen’s University, Canada DP2003/87. 
Brennan, G.; Buchanan, J. (1980). The power to tax: Analytical 
foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 235 p. 
Brown, C. V.; Jackson, P. M. (1990). Public Sector Economics. Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell. 448 p. 
Collins, D. J. (2001). The 2000 reform of intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements in Australia. Paper presented for the International 
Symposium in Quebec, Canada, September. 
Ebel, R. D.; Peteri, G. (2007). The Kosovo Decentralization Briefing 
book. Open Society Institute. Budapest. 267 p. 
Slavinskaite et. al. / Theoretical Analysis of the Fiscal Federalism 
www.ijceas.com 
266 
 
Faggini, M.; Parziale, A. (2016). A New Perspective for Fiscal 
Federalism; The NK Model, Journal of Economic Issues 50(4): 1069-
1104. 
Faguet, J. P. (1997). Decentralization and local government performance: 
Improving public services provision in Bolivia, Revista de Economia de 
la Universidad Del Rosario 127–176. 
Hobbes, T. (1660). The Leviathan, chapter 1. 508 p. 
Inman, R. P.; Rubinfeld, D. L. (1997). Rethinking Federalism, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 11 43–64. 
Lockwood, B. (2002). Distributive politics and the costs of centralisation, 
Review of Economic Studies 69(2): 313–337.  
McLure, C. (1998). The revenue assignment problem: ends, means, and 
constraints, Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial 
Management 9(4): 652–683. 
Musgrave, R. A. (1959). The Theory of Public Finance. A Study in 
Public Economy. New York: McGraw Hill. 628 p. 
Oates, W. E. (1972).  Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 256 p. 
Oates, W. E. (2005). Toward a second generation theory of fiscal 
Federalism, International Tax and Public Finance 12: 349–373. 
Olson, M. (1969). The principle of ‘fiscal equivalence’: the division of 
responsibilities among different levels of government, American 
Economic Review 59: 479–487. 
Petchey, J.; Levchenkova, S. (2003). Welfare effects of National Taxes in 
an Economy with Regions, Economic Record 79(245): 218–228. 
Picciotto, R.; Wiesner, E. (1998). Evaluation and Development: The 
Institutional Dimension. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Prakash, Ch. J. (2015). Theory of fiscal federalism: an analysis, Journal 
of Social and Economic Development 17(2): 241-259. 
Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 36(4): 387–389. 
Seabright, P. (1996). Accountability and decentralisation in government: 
an incomplete contracts model, European Economic Review 40: 61–89. 
Slavinskaitė, N. (2014). Fiscal decentralization and economic theory, 
Revista de ciências empresariais e jurídicas 26: 109-128. 
Tiebout, Ch. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of 
Political Economy  64(5): 416–424. 
 International Journal of Contemporary Economics and  
Administrative Sciences 
ISSN: 1925 – 4423  
Volume: 9, Issue: 2, Year: 2019, pp. 250-267 
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo. 
267 
 
Vo, D. H. (2010). The economics of Fiscal Decentralization, Journal of 
Economics Surveys 24(4): 657–679. 
Wagner, R. (2007). Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance: 
An Exploratory Essay. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 9 p. 
Weingast, B. R. (1995). The economic role of political institutions: 
market-preserving federalism and economic development, Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organisations 15(1): 1–31. 
